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Abstract
An adversarial example is an input trans-
formed by small perturbations that ma-
chine learning models consistently misclassify.
While there are a number of methods proposed
to generate adversarial examples for text data,
it is not trivial to assess the quality of these
adversarial examples, as minor perturbations
(such as changing a word in a sentence) can
lead to a significant shift in their meaning,
readability and classification label. In this pa-
per, we propose an evaluation framework con-
sisting of a set of automatic evaluation met-
rics and human evaluation guidelines, to rig-
orously assess the quality of adversarial exam-
ples based on the aforementioned properties.
We experiment with six benchmark attacking
methods and found that some methods gener-
ate adversarial examples with poor readability
and content preservation. We also learned that
multiple factors could influence the attacking
performance, such as the length of the text in-
puts and architecture of the classifiers.
1 Introduction
Adversarial examples, a term introduced in
Szegedy et al. (2013), are inputs transformed by
small perturbations that machine learning models
consistently misclassify. The experiments are con-
ducted in the context of computer vision (CV), and
the core idea is encapsulated by an illustrative ex-
ample: after imperceptible noises are added to a
panda image, an image classifier predicts, with
high confidence, that it is a gibbon. Interestingly,
these adversarial examples can also be used to im-
prove the classifier — either as additional training
data (Szegedy et al., 2013) or as a regularisation
objective (Goodfellow et al., 2014) — thus provid-
ing motivation for generating effective adversarial
examples.
The germ of this paper comes from our inves-
tigation of adversarial attack methods for natural
language processing (NLP) tasks, e.g. sentiment
classification, which drives us to quantify what is
an “effective” or “good” adversarial example. In
the context of images, a good adversarial example
is typically defined according to two criteria:
(a) it has successfully fooled the target classifier;
(b) it is visually similar to the original example.
In NLP, defining a good adversarial example is
a little more involving. While criterion (b) can be
measured with a comparable text similarity metric
(e.g. BLEU or edit distance) and semantic similar-
ity metrics (e.g. cosine distance between sentence
embeddings), an adversarial example should also:
(c) be fluent or natural;
(d) preserve its original label.1
These two additional criteria are generally irrel-
evant for images, as adding minor perturbations
to an image is unlikely to: (1) create an uninter-
pretable image (while changing one word in a sen-
tence can render a sentence incoherent), and (2)
change how we perceive the image, say from see-
ing a panda to a gibbon (but a sentence’s sentiment
can be reversed by simply adding a negative ad-
verb such as not). Without considering criterion
(d), generating adversarial examples in NLP would
be trivial, as the model can learn to simply replace
a positive adjective (amazing) with a negative one
(awful) to attack a sentiment classifier, or substi-
tute a numeric token with another number to attack
a machine comprehension system that is queried
for the year of an event. In other words, while
criterion (d) is directly implied by criterion (b) in
1In the CV example, if the perturbed panda image looks
like a panda, it fulfils criterion (b) and (d). In an NLP task such
as sentiment classification, even though a perturbed sentence
may look similar to the original and so satisfies criterion (b),
the perturbed sentence might have the opposite sentiment
because of a word change (e.g. from good to tolerable).
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CV (a visually similar perturbed image generally
preserves its original label), this is not the case for
NLP. To the best of our knowledge, most studies on
adversarial example generation in NLP have largely
ignored these additional criteria (Wang et al., 2019;
Ebrahimi et al., 2017; Tsai et al., 2019; Gong et al.,
2018).
The core contribution of our paper is to introduce
a systematic evaluation framework that combines
automatic metrics and human judgements to assess
the quality of adversarial examples for NLP. We
focus on sentiment classification as the target task,
as it is a popular application that highlights the im-
portance of the criteria discussed above. It is worth
noting, however, that our framework is generic and
applies to any NLP task.
We test our evaluation framework on a number
of attacking methods, ranging from white-box to
black-box attacks for generating adversarial exam-
ples.2 For the human judgements, we crowdsource
the annotations to assess criteria (b), (c) and (d).
Our results reveal that examples generated from
most attacking methods are successful in fooling
the target classifiers, but their language is often
unnatural and the original label is not properly pre-
served. We also found that a number of external
factors have a substantial impact on the attacking
performance, such as the length of text inputs and
the classifier architectures. Lastly, we evaluate the
transferability of the adversarial examples and the
computational time of different attacking methods.
Transferability measures how effective the adver-
sarial examples (generated for one classifier) are in
attacking other classifiers.
2 Related Work
Most adversarial attack methods for text inputs are
derived from methods originally designed for im-
age inputs. These methods can be categorised into
three types: gradient-based attacks, optimisation-
based attacks and model-based attacks.
Gradient-based attacks are white-box attacks
that rely on the gradients of the target classifier
with respect to the input representation. This class
of attacking methods (Kurakin et al., 2016; Dong
et al., 2018; Kurakin et al., 2016) are by and large
inspired by the fast gradient sign method (FGSM)
(Goodfellow et al., 2014), and it has been shown to
2White-box attack assumes full access to the target clas-
sifier’s architecture and parameters; black-box attack, on the
other hand, does not.
be effective in attacking CV classifiers. However,
these gradient-based methods could not be applied
to text directly because perturbed word embeddings
do not necessarily map to valid words. Other meth-
ods such as DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.,
2016) that rely on perturbing the word embedding
space face similar roadblocks. Gong et al. (2018)
propose to use nearest neighbour search to find the
closest word to the perturbed embedding.
Both optimisation-based and model-based at-
tacks treat adversarial attack as an optimisation
problem where the constraints are to maximise the
loss of target classifiers and to minimise the dif-
ference between original and adversarial examples.
Between these two, the former uses optimisation
algorithms directly; while the latter trains a seper-
ate model to generate the adversarial examples and
therefore involves a training process. Some of the
most effective attacks for images are achieved by
optimisation-based methods, such as Goodfellow
et al. (2014) and Carlini and Wagner (2017) for
white-box attacks and Chen et al. (2017) for black-
box attacks. For texts, we also have white-box
attacks (Ebrahimi et al., 2017) and black-box at-
tacks (Gao et al., 2018; Li et al., 2018) proposed in
this category.
Model-based attacks are generally seen as grey-
box attacks as it requires access to target classifier
during training phase, but once it’s trained it can
generate adversarial examples independently. Xiao
et al. (2018) introduce a generative adversarial net-
work to generate the image perturbation from a
noise map. Generally in model-based attacks the
attacking method and target classifier form a large
network and the attacking method is trained us-
ing the loss from the target classifier. Note, how-
ever, that it is not very straightforward to use these
model-based techniques for text directly because
words in the adversarial examples are discrete and
the network is not fully differentiable.
3 Methodology
3.1 Sentiment Classifiers
There are a number of off-the-shelf neural models
for sentiment classification (Kim, 2014; Wang et al.,
2016), most of which are based on long-short term
memory networks (LSTM; Hochreiter and Schmid-
huber (1997)) or convolutional neural networks
(CNN; Kim (2014)). In this paper, we pre-train
three sentiment classifiers: BiLSTM, BiLSTM+A,
and CNN. These classifiers are targeted by dif-
ferent attacking methods to generate adversarial
examples (detailed in Section 3.2). BiLSTM is
composed of an embedding layer that maps indi-
vidual words to pre-trained word embeddings; a
number of bi-directional LSTMs that capture se-
quential contexts; and an output layer that maps the
averaged LSTM hidden states to a binary output.
BiLSTM+A is similar to BiLSTM except it has an
extra self-attention layer which learns to attend to
salient words for sentiment classification, and we
compute the weighted mean of the LSTM hidden
states prior to the output layer. Manual inspection
of the attention weights show that polarity words
such as awesome and disappointed are assigned
with higher weights. Finally, CNN has a number
of convolutional filters of varying sizes, and their
outputs are concatenated, pooled and fed to a fully-
connected layer followed by a binary output layer.
Recent development in transformer-based pre-
trained models have produced state-of-the-art per-
formance on a range of NLP tasks (Devlin et al.,
2018; Yang et al., 2019). To validate the transfer-
ability of the attacking methods, we also test it on
a fine-tuned BERT classifier. That is, we use the
adversarial examples generated for attacking the
three previous classifiers (BiLSTM, BiLSTM+A
or CNN) as test data for BERT and measure its
classification performance to understand whether
these adversarial examples can fool BERT.
3.2 Benchmark Attacking Methods
We experiment with six benchmark attacking meth-
ods for texts, ranging from white-box attacks:
FGM, FGVM, DEEPFOOL (Gong et al., 2018),
HOTFLIP (Ebrahimi et al., 2017)), and TYC (Tsai
et al., 2019) to black-box attacks: TEXTFOOLER
(Jin et al., 2019).
To perturb the discrete inputs, both FGM and
FGVM introduce noises in the word embedding
space via the fast gradient method (Goodfellow
et al., 2014) and reconstruct the input by mapping
perturbed word embeddings to valid words via near-
est neighbour search. Between FGM and FGVM,
the former introduce noises that is proportional to
the sign of the gradients while the latter introduce
perturbations proportional to the gradients directly.
The proportion is known as the overshoot value
and denoted by . DEEPFOOL uses the same trick
to deal with discrete inputs except that, instead of
using the fast gradient method, it uses the method
introduced in Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016) for
image to search for an optimal direction to perturb
the word embeddings.
Unlike the previous three methods, HOTFLIP
and TYC rely on performing one or more atomic
flip operations to replace words while monitoring
the label change given by the target classifier. In
HOTFLIP, the directional derivatives w.r.t. flip op-
erations are calculated and the flip operation that
results in the largest increase in loss is selected.3
TYC is similar to FGM, FGVM and DEEPFOOL
in that it also uses nearest neighbour search to map
the perturbed embeddings to valid words, but in-
stead of using the perturbed tokens directly, it uses
greedy search or beam search to flip original to-
kens to perturbed ones one-at-a-time in order of
their vulnerability.
TEXTFOOLER, the only black-box attack
method tested, is a query-based method. Since
it assumes no access to the full architecture of the
target classifier, it learns the order of vulnerabil-
ity of tokens in an input sentence according to the
change of prediction scores produced by the target
classifier when a specific token is discarded. Once
the order of vulnerability of words is identified,
similar to HOTFLIP and TYC, it greedily replaces
tokens in the order of vulnerability one-at-a-time
until the prediction of the target classifier changes.
To ensure similarity between the adversarial exam-
ples and the original ones, the substituted tokens
are selected to satisfy semantic, part-of-speech and
sentence embedding similarity constraints. Note
that TEXTFOOLER uses the classifier’s prediction
scores to learn token vulnerability; in a more re-
alistic black-box scenario the classifier may only
reveal the predicted labels (without showing the
underlying scores associated with each label).
4 Experiments
4.1 Datasets
We construct three datasets based on the Yelp re-
views4 and the sentence-level Rotten Tomato (RT)
movie reviews5. For Yelp, we binarise the ratings6,
and create 2 datasets, where we keep only reviews
3While the original paper explores both character flips and
word flips, we test only word flips here. The rationale is that
introducing character flips to word-based target classifiers is
essentially changing word tokens to [unk], which creates a
confound for our experiments.
4https://www.yelp.com/dataset
5http://www.cs.cornell.edu/people/pabo/
movie-review-data/
6Ratings≥4 is set as positive and ratings≤2 as negative.
with ≤ 50 tokens (yelp50) and ≤200 tokens
(yelp200). For RT (rt), we directly use the bina-
rised dataset which contains 5331 positive and 5331
negative tokenized sentences. We randomly parti-
tion both datasets into train/dev/test sets (90/5/5 for
yelp50; 99/0.5/0.5 for yelp200; and 80/10/10
for rt). For yelp50 and yelp200, we use
spaCy7 for tokenisation. We train and tune target
classifiers (see Section 3.1) using the training and
development sets, and evaluate their performance
on the original examples in the test sets as well
as the adversarial examples generated by attacking
methods for the test sets. These datasets present a
variation in the text length (e.g. the average number
of words for rt, yelp50 and yelp200 is 22, 34
and 82 words respectively) and training data size
(e.g. rt: 8K examples, yelp50: 407K examples,
and yelp200: 2M examples).
4.2 Implementation Details
We use the pre-trained glove.840B.300d em-
beddings (Pennington et al., 2014) for the first 5
attacking methods and the counter-fitted word em-
bedding (Mrksˇic´ et al., 2016) for TEXTFOOLER.
For FGM, FGVM and DEEPFOOL, we tune , the
overshoot hyper-parameter (Section 3.2) and keep
the iterative step n static (5).8 For TYC, besides
 we also tune the upper limit of flipped words,
ranging from 10%–100% of the maximum length.
For HOTFLIP and TEXTFOOLER, we tune only the
upper limit of flipped words, in the range of [1, 7].
For target classifiers, we tune batch size, learn-
ing rate, number of layers, number of units, atten-
tion size (for BiLSTM+A), filter sizes and dropout
probability (for CNN). For BERT, we use the de-
fault fine-tuning hyper-parameter values except for
batch size, where we adjust based on memory con-
sumption. Note that after the target classifiers are
trained their weights are not updated when running
the attacking methods.
5 Evaluation
We propose both automatic metrics and human eval-
uation strategies to assess the quality of adversarial
examples, based on four criteria defined in Sec-
tion 1: (a) attacking performance (i.e. how well
they fool the classifier); (b) textual and semantic
7https://spacy.io
8We search for the best  within a large range (orders
of magnitude in difference) to achieve a particular attacking
performance.
similarity between the original input and the adver-
sarial input; (c) fluency of the adversarial example;
and (d) label preservation. Note that the automatic
metrics only address the first 3 criteria (a, b and c);
we contend that criterion (d) requires manual eval-
uation, as the judgement of whether the original
label is preserved is inherently a human decision.
5.1 Automatic Evaluation: Metrics
As sentiment classification is our target task, we
use the standard classification accuracy (ACC, the
lower the better) to evaluate the attacking perfor-
mance of adversarial examples (criterion (a)).
To assess the similarity between the original and
(transformed) adversarial examples (criterion (b)),
we compute BLEU scores (Papineni et al., 2002)
to measure word overlap; and SEM scores, cosine
similarity between the representations of original
examples and adversarial examples generated by
the universal sentence encoder (Cer et al., 2018),
to measure semantic similarity. For both metrics,
higher scores represent better performance.
To measure fluency, we first explore a super-
vised BERT model fine-tuned to predict linguis-
tic acceptability (Devlin et al., 2018). However,
in preliminary experiments we found that BERT
performs very poorly at predicting the acceptabil-
ity of adversarial examples (e.g. it predicts word-
salad-like sentences generated by FGVM as very
acceptable), revealing the brittleness of these su-
pervised models. We next explore unsupervised
approaches (Lau et al., 2017; Lau et al., 2020),
using normalised sentence probabilities estimated
by pre-trained language models for measuring ac-
ceptability. Following Lau et al. (2020), we use
XLNet (Yang et al., 2019) as the language model.
The acceptability score of a sentence is calcu-
lated based on the normalised sentence probabil-
ity: logP (s)/(((5 + |s|)/(5 + 1))α), where s is
the sentence, and α is a hyper-parameter (set to
0.8) to dampen the impact of large values (Vaswani
et al., 2017). To measure how fluency differs be-
tween an adversarial example and the original sen-
tence, we compute the difference in their accept-
ability scores, giving us the acceptability metric
ACPT.
Note that we only compute BLEU and ACPT for
adversarial examples that have successfully fooled
the classifier. Our rationale is that unsuccessful
examples can artificially boost these scores by not
making any modifications, and so the better ap-
proach is to only consider successful examples.
5.2 Automatic Evaluation: Results
We present the performance of the attacking meth-
ods against 3 target classifiers (Table 1A; top) and
on 3 datasets (Table 1B; bottom). We choose 3
ACC thresholds for the attacking performance: T0,
T1 and T2, which correspond approximately to ac-
curacy scores of 90%, 80% and 70% for the Yelp
datasets (yelp50, yelp200)9; and 60%, 50%,
30% for RT dataset (rt) 10. Our rationale is that
each method should be compared on the same basis
if our focus is to to provide a fair assessment on the
quality of the adversarial examples, and the attack-
ing performance constitutes a reasonable basis.
Looking at BLEU, SEM and ACPT,
TEXTFOOLER is the most consistent method over
multiple datasets and classifiers. HOTFLIP is
also fairly competitive, occasionally producing
better BLEU scores (CNN at T1; at T0, T1, T2
on yelp200 and T2 on rt). Gradient-based
methods FGM and FGVM perform very poorly.
In general, they tend to produce word salad
adversarial examples, as indicated by their poor
ACPT scores. DEEPFOOL similarly generates
incoherent sentences with low BLEU scores,
but occasionally produces good SEM (at T0)
and ACPT (BiLSTM at T1 and T2), suggesting
potential brittleness of the automatic evaluation
approach for evaluating semantic similarity and
acceptability.
Comparing the performance across different
ACC thresholds, we observe a consistent pattern
of decreasing performance over all metrics as the
attacking performance increases from T0 to T2, es-
pecially drastic for FGM, FGVM and DEEPFOOL
when the attacking rate changes from T0 to T1.
These observations suggest that all methods are
trading off fluency and content preservation as they
attempt to generate stronger adversarial examples.
We now focus on Table 1A to understand the
impact of model architecture for the target classi-
fier. With 1 word flip as the upper limit for HOT-
FLIP, the accuracy of BiLSTM+A and BiLSTM
drops to T0 (approximately 4% accuracy decrease)
while the accuracy of CNN drops to T1 (approxi-
mately 13% accuracy decrease). Within the same
9Most methods are capable of achieving attacking perfor-
mance of 30% or lower (ACC), although that comes with
severe degradation to the quality of the adversarial examples.
10We choose 30% instead of 40% because, for HOTFLIP,
flipping one words achieved an accuracy drop to 30.1%
attacking performance thresholds, FGM, FGVM
and DEEPFOOL achieve higher BLEU, SEM and
ACPT scores when targeting CNN compared to
those scores when targeting the other two models.
These observations suggest that convolutional net-
works are more vulnerable to attacks (noting that
it is the predominant architecture for CV). Inter-
estingly, the CNN model seems to be very robust
against TEXTFOOLER on yelp50, where the ac-
curacy stays at around 87.0% regardless of how we
tune TEXTFOOLER.
Looking at Table 1B, we also find that the
attacking performance is influenced by the in-
put text length and the number of training ex-
amples for target classifiers. For HOTFLIP and
TEXTFOOLER, we see improvements over BLEU,
SEM and ACPT as text length increases from
yelp50 to yelp200, indicating the performance
of these two methods is more affected by input
lengths. We think this is because with more words
it is more likely for them to find a vulnerable
spot to target. While for TYC, we see improve-
ments over BLEU and ACPT as the number of
training examples for target classifier decreases
from yelp200 (2M) to yelp50 (407K), indi-
cating TYC are less effective for attacking target
classifiers that are trained with more data. This sug-
gests that increasing the training data for a classifier
could potentially improve its robustness against cer-
tain attacks. The effect of the number of training
examples for target classifier is further validated by
the attacking performance of TEXTFOOLER and
HOTFLIP on rt. Despite that rt has the shortest
input (with average 22 tokens), changing 1 words
for TEXTFOOLER and HOTFLIP successfully ren-
dered accuracy drops from 78.8% to 49.9% and
30.1%, respectively. Comparing the same number
of word change, the drop of accuracy introduced
by TEXTFOOLER and HOTFLIP are 10% and 4%
on yelp50; and 4% and 7% on yelp200.
Another factor that possibly makes it easier to
attack rt is that movie reviews being more descrip-
tive and therefore creating potential ambiguity in
their expression of sentiment. In comparison, the
restaurant reviews are more straightforward, using
polarising words such as awesome or awful. The
net effect is that sentiment classification is “eas-
ier” for the restaurant reviews (as the classifier can
make the decision based on vocabulary choices),
which in turn make adversarial attacks “harder”.
To check how well these adversarial examples
(A) Dataset: yelp50
Models: acc BiLSTM+A: 96.8 CNN: 94.3 BiLSTM: 96.6
Attack ACC BLEU SEM ACPT ACC BLEU SEM ACPT ACC BLEU SEM ACPT
T0
FGM 93.0 34.6 17.4 -25.9 92.3 65.9 47.1 -16.6 90.5 30.0 2.3 -25.9
FGVM 93.4 29.1 10.1 -17.7 93.4 89.0 80.0 -5.8 92.9 19.6 16.2 -21.4
DEEPFOOL 94.7 20.1 61.7 -20.6 92.7 68.6 72.8 -15.0 93.9 16.0 68.8 -17.8
TYC 91.7 64.7 38.9 -14.4 90.4 59.0 41.5 -16.9 90.8 65.4 34.9 -13.6
HOTFLIP 92.5 92.6 66.5 -3.7 – – – – 93.2 92.7 67.3 -3.5
TEXTFOOLER – – – – – – – – – – – –
T1
FGM 88.7 15.4 -13.1 -28.9 82.2 16.3 -7.1 -35.2 81.0 11.6 -15.6 -27.7
FGVM 83.9 7.6 -24.2 -12.1 82.6 20.6 2.2 -34.0 85.4 11.4 -13.9 -15.8
DEEPFOOL 86.8 13.4 27.6 -10.1 84.6 17.5 33.4 -34.4 80.8 5.6 14.1 -0.7
TYC 83.8 48.3 11.6 -18.9 87.6 41.2 29.4 -21.8 81.8 47.4 8.9 -19.0
HOTFLIP 80.3 85.6 47.9 -7.0 81.5 92.5 77.1 -3.8 82.8 85.1 47.6 -7.0
TEXTFOOLER 86.5 92.6 88.7 -1.8 87.7 91.9 94.2 -2.1 85.8 92.8 82.1 -1.6
T2
FGM 72.7 2.7 -33.6 -34.5 71.9 2.4 -30.8 -38.5 71.4 3.3 -26.3 -28.8
FGVM 77.8 4.6 -20.9 -9.3 71.7 7.0 -18.7 -38.3 70.9 0.3 -37.0 -4.6
DEEPFOOL 72.1 3.1 -28.5 -12.6 70.9 5.4 -20.8 -38.3 72.0 2.9 6.0 0.5
TYC 75.3 41.2 -7.6 -20.7 73.4 38.9 -15.3 -21.4 77.5 43.1 0.6 -19.9
HOTFLIP 75.3 80.0 38.1 -7.8 70.8 84.7 63.4 -7.1 70.6 78.7 36.7 -9.8
TEXTFOOLER 73.6 88.5 84.1 -2.9 – – – – 70.8 88.4 86.9 -2.77
(B) Target classifier: BiLSTM+A
Datasets: acc yelp50: 96.8 yelp200: 97.9 rt: 78.8
Attack ACC BLEU SEM ACPT ACC BLEU SEM ACPT ACC BLEU SEM ACPT
T0
FGM 93.0 34.6 17.4 -25.9 92.1 13.8 3.2 -37.8 66.3 4.9 -15.9 -29.1
FGVM 93.4 29.1 10.1 -17.7 94.2 55.4 63.7 -18.3 66.3 25.3 13.3 -24.4
DEEPFOOL 94.7 20.1 61.7 -20.6 – – – – 62.2 2.1 -31.9 -5.9
TYC 91.7 64.7 38.9 -14.4 90.3 51.2 44.5 -20.3 65.4 67.2 33.2 -9.3
HOTFLIP 92.5 92.6 66.5 -3.7 90.8 96.4 75.6 -3.3 – – – –
TEXTFOOLER – – – – 93.8 96.3 94.4 -1.6 – – – –
T1
FGM 88.7 15.4 -13.4 -28.9 81.6 23.0 6e-3 -37.0 – – – –
FGVM 83.9 7.6 -24.2 -12.1 80.8 17.2 10.6 -35.7 48.8 7.1 -11.6 -23.7
DEEPFOOL 86.8 13.4 27.6 -10.1 82.3 19.1 -0.4 -9.0 49.8 0.4 -41.7 -18.6
TYC 83.8 48.3 11.6 -18.9 86.9 42.6 35.7 -23.7 50.6 46.0 18.7 -16.1
HOTFLIP 80.3 85.6 47.9 -7.0 83.2 94.8 67.2 -4.1 – – – –
TEXTFOOLER 86.5 92.6 88.7 -1.8 84.2 92.6 90.3 -3.3 49.9 87.7 73.0 -3.5
T2
FGM 72.7 2.7 -33.6 -34.5 72.8 6.9 14.8 -28.5 – – – –
FGVM 77.8 4.6 -20.9 -9.3 70.6 1.5 -26.5 -5.4 – – – –
DEEPFOOL 72.1 3.1 -28.5 -12.6 72.2 7.7 25.2 -25.4 – – – –
TYC 75.3 41.2 -7.6 -20.7 76.9 36.3 8.7 -23.5 – – – –
HOTFLIP 75.3 80.0 38.1 -7.8 77.0 93.8 62.9 -4.7 30.1 89.0 64.5 -5.0
TEXTFOOLER 73.6 88.5 84.1 -2.9 75.7 90.2 88.2 -4.5 33.7 82.0 69.1 -5.5
Table 1: Results based on automatic metrics. Top half (A) presents 3 different target classifiers evaluated on one
dataset (yelp50); bottom half (B) tests 3 datasets using one classifier (BiLSTM+A). For ACPT, less negative
values are better. Boldface indicates optimal performance for an attacking performance and target classifier. Miss-
ing numbers (dashed lines) indicate the method is unable to produce the desired accuracy, e.g. HOTFLIP with only
1 word flip produces 81.5% accuracy (T1) when attacking CNN on yelp50, and so T0 accuracy is unachievable.
generalise to fooling other classifiers, also known
as transferability, we feed the adversarial examples
from the 3 best methods, i.e. TYC, HOTFLIP and
TEXTFOOLER, to a pre-trained BERT trained for
sentiment classification and measure its accuracy
(Figure 1). Unsurprisingly, we observe that the
attacking performance (i.e. the drop in ACC) is not
as good as those reported in Table 1 . Interestingly,
we find that TEXTFOOLER, the best performing
method, produces the least effective adversarial
examples for BERT, indicating poor transferability,
while examples generated from TYC perform the
best in fooling BERT. Manually inspecting the
examples generated by TEXTFOOLER, we notice
it tries to replace as few words as possible to move
an examples just across the decision boundary of
the target classifier (indicated by very close scores
between different labels). This change appears be
very targeted for a specific classifier, and as such is
unlikely to fool other classifiers.
As an additional insight, we also evaluated the
computational time of different attacking meth-
ods. We calculate the the generation time of the
three best performing methods TYC, HOTFLIP and
TEXTFOOLER when they attack the test dataset
of rt, yelp50, and yelp200 at T2 attacking
threshold. Table 2 shows the corresponding compu-
tational time (seconds per example). We found that
HOTFLIP achieves comparable performance with
TEXTFOOLER but only consumes 1/3 of its compu-
tational time. TYC is even more time-consuming
than TEXTFOOLER. Also, the speed of HOTFLIP
seems not affected by the increase of the sentence
lengths, but TEXTFOOLER and TYC take much
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Figure 1: Accuracy of BERT on adversarial examples
generated from TYC, HOTFLIP and TEXTFOOLER for
different target classifiers (top row) and for different
datasets (bottom row). BERT’s accuracy on original
examples are denoted as red line in each plot.
Methods rt yelp50 yelp200
TYC – 1.2 13.8
HOTFLIP 0.06 0.3 0.6
TEXTFOOLER 0.5 1.0 8.0
Table 2: Computational time (seconds per example) of
TYC, HOTFLIP and TEXTFOOLER when attacking dif-
ferent datasets.
longer time to attack longer input examples.
To summarise, our results demonstrate that the
best attacking methods (e.g. TEXTFOOLER and
HOTFLIP) may not produce adversarial examples
that generalise to fooling other classifiers. We also
saw that convolutional networks are generally more
vulnerable than recurrent networks, and that dataset
features such as text length and training data size
can influence the performance of adversarial at-
tacks.
5.3 Human Evaluation: Design
Automatic metrics provide a proxy to quantify the
quality of the adversarial examples. To validate that
these metrics work, we conduct a crowdsourcing
experiment on Figure-Eight.11 Recall that the auto-
matic metrics do not assess sentiment preservation
(criterion (d)); we evaluate that aspect here.
We experiment with the 3 best methods (TYC
HOTFLIP and TEXTFOOLER) on 2 accuracy thresh-
olds (T0 and T2), using BiLSTM+A as the classi-
fier. For each method and threshold, we randomly
sample 25 positive-to-negative and 25 negative-to-
positive examples. To control for quality, we re-
serve and annotate 10% of the samples ourselves as
11https://www.figure-eight.com/
control questions. Workers are first presented with
10 control questions as a quiz, and only those who
pass the quiz with at least 80% accuracy can con-
tinue to work on the task. We display 10 questions
per page, where one control question is embedded
to continue monitor worker performance.12 The
task is designed such that each control question
can only be seen once per worker. We restrict our
jobs to workers in United States, United Kingdoms,
Australia, and Canada.
To evaluate the criteria (b) textual similarity, (c)
fluency, and (d) sentiment preservation, we ask the
annotators three questions:
1. Is snippet B a good paraphrase of snippet A?# Yes # Somewhat yes # No
2. How natural does the text read?# Very unnatural # Somewhat natural #
Natural
3. What is the sentiment of the text?# Positive # Negative # Cannot tell
For question 1, we display both the adversarial
input and the original input, while for question 2
and 3 we present only the adversarial example. As
a baseline, we also run a survey on question 2 and
3 for 50 random original (unperturbed) samples.
5.4 Human Evaluation: Results
We present the percentage of answers to each ques-
tion in Figure 2. The green bars illustrate how
well the adversarial examples paraphrase the origi-
nal ones; blue how natural the adversarial examples
read; and red whether the sentiment of the adversar-
ial examples is consistent compared to the original.
Looking at the performance of the original sen-
tences (“(a) Original samples”), we see that their
language is largely fluent and their sentiment is
generally consistent to the original examples’.
On content preservation (criterion (b); green
bars), all methods produce poor paraphrases on
yelp50 except for TEXTFOOLER.
Next we look at fluency (criterion (c); blue bars).
We see similar trend: with the increased attack-
ing performance, the readability of adversarial
examples generated by different attacking meth-
ods is getting poorer. HOTFLIP is fairly competi-
tive, producing adversarial examples that are only
marginally less fluent compared to the original at
T0. At T2, however, it begin to trade off fluency.
12Workers are required to maintain their performance (80%
accuracy) throughout the annotation process.
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Figure 2: Human evaluation results.
TEXTFOOLER, on the other hand, achieved even
slightly better fluency than the original examples at
T2, indicating the substituted tokens fit the context
very well.
Lastly, we consider sentiment preservation (cri-
terion (d); red bars). All methods trade off senti-
ment preservation to achieve better attacking perfor-
mance. Again both HOTFLIP and TEXTFOOLER
are the better methods here (interestingly, we ob-
serve an increase in agreement as their attacking
performance increases from T0 and T2).
Comparing automatic evaluation and human
evaluation results, we found that the SEM scores
are generally consistent with the human evalua-
tion results on semantic preservation, while the
BLEU score is less effective as evidenced by the
high BLEU score of HOTFLIP on yelp50 and
poor paraphrasing performance in the same settings.
The ACPT metric appears to be a solid metric in
evaluating fluency, as we see a good agreement
with human evaluation across the three attacking
methods.
Summarising our findings, TEXTFOOLER is gen-
erally the best method across all criteria, noting
that its adversarial examples, however, have the
poorest transferability. HOTFLIP produces compa-
rable results with TEXTFOOLER for meeting the
four criteria and similarly suffer from poor trans-
ferability. TYC generates adversarial examples
with better transferability but do not do well in
terms of content preservation and fluency. In terms
of computational time, HOTFLIP is the most ef-
ficient, consuming less than 1/3 of the time con-
sumed by the other two methods. The difference is
more profound for longer input sentences. FGM,
FGVM and DEEPFOOL perform very poor as they
largely sacrifice example qualities to achieve at-
tacking performance, indicating directly mapping
from perturbed word embedding is not applicable
in NLP. All said, we found that all methods tend
to trade-off sentiment preservation for attacking
performance, revealing that these methods in a way
“cheat” by simply flipping the sentiments of the
original sentences to fool the classifier, and there-
fore the adversarial examples might be ineffective
for adversarial training, as they are not examples
that reveal potential vulnerabilities in the classifier.
6 Conclusion
We propose an evaluation framework for assessing
the quality of adversarial examples in NLP, based
on four criteria: (a) attacking performance, (b) tex-
tual similarity; (c) fluency; (d) label preservation.
Our framework involves both automatic and hu-
man evaluation, and we test 6 benchmark methods
involving both white-box and black-box attacking
methods. We found that the architecture of the tar-
get classifier is an important factor when it comes to
attacking performance, e.g. CNNs are more vulner-
able than LSTMs. Data features such as length of
text and input domains are also influencing factors
that affect how difficulty it is to perform adversarial
attack. Lastly, we observe in our human evalua-
tion that on short texts that express clear positive or
negative sentiments (such as yelp50), these meth-
ods produce adversarial examples that tend not to
preserve their semantic content and have low read-
ability. More importantly, these methods “cheat”
by simply flipping the sentiment in the adversarial
examples, and this behaviour is evident especially
on the yelp50 dataset, suggesting they could be
ineffective for adversarial training.
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